This article discusses conflicts of interest existing between investors and their financial advisors.
Introduction
The mutual fund industry in the United States has known a tremendous growth over the last 30 years.
By 2009, half of American households held shares in one or several mutual funds (ICI 2010) .
Moreover 8,000 mutual funds manage 11,121 billion dollars in the United-States (ICI (2010) ). This success has been supported by substantial marketing efforts and generous commission schemes to induce sales brokers.
To purchase mutual fund shares indeed, investors can turn to many types of intermediaries and have choices as how to pay for their services. They may pay a "sales load" at the time they purchase shares, or a deferred sales load when they redeem shares, and/or they may have to pay annually 12b-1 fees that are deducted from the fund's assets. Combined together, these fees entailed the creation of different share classes typically labeled class A, B and C shares. Investors make a choice between these share classes according to their characteristics in terms of invested amounts and expected holding period. However it may occur that the related compensation scheme of their financial advisor doesn't match their particular needs. In doing so, the existence of this conflict of interest drove to numerous litigation cases (Senator et al (2006) and Krawczyk (2004) .
So what are the characteristics of investors exposing them to this conflict of interest?
Are investors more or less exposed as determining parameters them to this conflict of interest vary?
Most of studies explain this conflict of interest either with the Expect Holding period O'Neal (1999b), Livingston and O'Neal (1998) , Davis (1995) or with the invested amounts Foster (2009), Senator et al 2006 , SEC 2004 . The latter has been the most frequently treated especially because it entailed many litigation cases. Our approach integrates these two causes to explain this conflict of interest.
To answer these questions, a preliminary part introduces an overview of mutual fund fees in the US.
Thanks to numerical simulations in a second part, it is determined characteristics of investors concerned by a conflicting situation with their financial advisor. It is made the restrictive assumption that invested amounts are lower than $50,000. However, this assumption will be relaxed in the last part. In a third part, varying variables of the model, it is emphasized the evolution of these characteristics.
Mutual fund fees
Investors willing to buy mutual fund shares do not all call for brokers' services and it implies a different pricing structure. It is common practice to distinguish load from no-load mutual funds.
Load funds use brokerage firms to distribute their shares or any other intermediary between them and investors. These intermediaries advise investors in order to guide their choices and to provide additional services 2 . Investors care about these guidance and services and it justifies the payment of load fees.
A no-load fund is a mutual fund whose shares are sold without a sales commission and with limited distribution fees 3 . No-load funds adopt a more direct relationship with their clients in order to promote their shares. It relies on relatively cheaper distribution methods (advertisement, direct mails…).
In doing so, non-sophisticated investors tend to invest in mutual funds with load fees, under the influence of marketing and their brokers' recommendations ICI (1997), Del Guercio (2002) whereas sophisticated investors choose no-load mutual funds. Thereafter this paper focuses on nonsophisticated investors as it is considered conflicts of interests between investors and their brokers.
According to their invested amount and their expected holding period, investors have to make a choice among different classes of shares which result from combinations of three types of fees. Three main share classes are usually mentioned and typically denoted by A, B, C as described in table 1 (Annex 1):
-Class A shares charge front-end loads declining according to the level of the invested amount and 12b-1 fees relatively lower in comparison to the other share classes. Class A shares are the only one to propose front-end loads. In addition to their profitable aspect, front-end loads induce investors to stay longer in the fund in order to amortize them. Compared to the Class B and C shares described hereafter, funds with Class A shares are more suitable for investors with a relatively longer expected holding period.
-Class B shares are an alternative to Class A shares for investors with a long-term investment horizon. They adopt a coercive approach to prevent from an early withdrawal of the investor.
Instead of paying front-end loads, the investor pays deferred loads in case of redemption of shares.
These deferred loads decrease with each year the share is held. Deferred loads decline to zero over 7 years. Additionally 12b-1 fees for Class B and C shares are of the same order and then relatively higher to those applied to Class A shares. Class B shares are usually converted into Class A shares after the eighth year of investment to avoid that investors bear higher 12b-1 fees too long.
-Class C shares charge relatively higher 12b-1 fees. They also include deferred loads of 1 % if the investor redeems his or her shares within the first year and zero the subsequent years. Mutual funds using Class C Shares are also called "level load funds". Considering the relative combinations of fees they use, Class C shares are particularly suitable for investors with a short term expected holding period. Moreover, they allow a more reactive management of the investor's portfolio changing more frequently of mutual fund at a lower cost.
The conflict of interest analysis
The conflict of interest results from the inadequacy between interests of the investor in terms of fees charged and the related compensation of the broker. In such a situation a broker may be induced to advise a class of share not suitable to an investor according to his or her characteristics in terms of expected holding period or invested amount. In doing so, what are the characteristics of investors concerned by conflicting situations with their financial advisor?
In this part, it is only considered situations where invested amounts are lower than $50,000 to avoid any questions concerning discount policy and to isolate characteristics related to the expected holding period of the investor. Characteristics concerning the invested amount will be treated further.
The model
To 
The annual holding-period return of investors (HPR)
The Holding Period Return is the total net return of a mutual share over the period during which it was held. To compare this HPR between different investment horizons and between share classes we annualize the HPR to obtain a percentage per year.
For each class of share, the related net expected annualized holding-period return is compared in order to estimate the most suitable share class according to the expected holding period of the investor. Each class A, B, C share has a specific combination of fees as described in 
For the Class B share, the formula takes into account the deferred loads (DL) for the corresponding year and the conversion into Class A share after z = 8 years.
The annual net Holding Period Return is graphically represented using figures appearing in Table 2 .
An average gross return of 12% per year has been assumed for this numerical simulation. The chart below displays the evolution of the annual Holding Period Return according to the expected holding period of investors for each share class. Each point on one of these curves corresponds to a date at which an investor withdraws his or her money from a mutual fund. The corresponding coordinate on the Y axis is the average net return an investor could benefit each year until the date of withdrawal. Assuming an average gross return of 12%, an investor that held a fund with a Class A share for 4 years can expect to obtain each year an average net return of 9.2%. 5 The daily expense ratio results from the annual expense ratio comprising 12b-1 fees and management fees charged to the investor every year and as long as he or she holds his or her shares of mutual fund.
Because HPR A and HPR B are very similar, the comparison will mainly focus on HPR A and HPR C for the relevance of the analysis. The intersection point of HPR A and HPR C means that for the corresponding holding period, an investor is indifferent between having a Class A share and a Class C share. t* inv denotes this intersection point.
Chart 1 shows that an investor with an investment horizon longer than t* inv = 7.9 years would prefer to acquire a Class A share. Conversely, an investor with a shorter investment horizon would prefer to have a Class C share. t* inv , the intersection point of HPR A and HPR C , is solution of the system:
The Present Value Commission of brokers (PVC)
Financial advisors are rewarded for getting a new client through two types of commissions:
-An initial sales commission (IC i ) stemming from front-end loads and paid when the new client enters into the fund and -A trailing sales commission (TC i ) that is paid quarterly to the financial advisor as long as his or her client keeps his or her shares.
As described in Table 1 the financial advisor's earnings depend of the share class sold to the investor.
The Present Value Commission represent the total compensation that the broker receives for the entire duration the investor keeps his or her shares.
The trailing commission for the fund i (TC i ) is paid to the broker on each quarter and deducted from 12b-1 fees. TC i is computed on a daily basis n. Assuming that a quarter includes 63 working days, the following expression gives the trailing commission for the class i share on the quarter m:
Then, the expression of the Present Value Commission can be written as the sum of the Initial Commission and the discounted Trailing Commissions. T is the whole length of time in quarters the investor holds his or her shares and k is the discount rate.
Apart from front-end loads applied to the Class A share, the formula used to obtain the Present Value
Commission is the same for the three classes of share i.
To solve this geometric sequence (5) The present Value Commission of brokers is graphically represented according to the expected holding-period of investors for each share class 6 as below. According to these equations and using figures in Table 1 , we conduct a numerical simulation as shown in Table 2 . Calculations are based on a gross annual return of 12% and a risk free rate of 3% has been applied to discount commissions of brokers. 
Divergent / convergent interest areas and characteristics of investors
Comparing the broker's PVC with the investor's HPR according to various investment horizons, the conflict of interest arises indeed.
• A broker could prefer to advise a Class C share to a long term investor, while a Class A share would be more suitable.
• A broker could prefer to advise a Class A share to a short term investor, while a Class C share would be more suitable.
To be more precise a comparison of indifference points of investors and brokers reveals a potential conflict of interest but not for every expected holding period. It may be delimited areas of holding period with a conflict of interest and areas of holding period where interests of brokers and investors converge.
Points of indifference t* inv and t* Brok between classes A and C shares are respectively set after 7.9 years corresponding to a HPR of 10.11% and after 4.4 years corresponding to a PVC of 6.21%.
Based on these key figures, these areas of divergent and convergent interests are shown in the Table 3 . As can be seen t* inv and t* Brok may vary with variables of the model. Therefore the convergent interest area is unstable and its dynamics should be analyzed.
Dynamics of the convergent interest area
Assuming that investors are uniformly distributed according to their expected holding period, variations of the convergent interest area may give information about the proportion of investors concerned by the conflict of interests. This study may help whether to suggest solutions to enlarge the convergent interest area or to stress situations in which more or less investors are exposed to conflicts of interests.
Convergent and divergent interest areas vary according to exogenous factors as the discount rate, expectations about the market trend, the specific return of a fund, the level of fees and commissions. It is then analyzed effects of these variations on the convergent interest area. The assumption of an invested amount lower than $50,000 will be relaxed at the end of this part.
To keep consistency with the philosophy of share classes, the analysis of the conflict of interest respects the following assumptions:
• Let E A , E C , FL A , IC A , IC C , TC A , TC C , R A , R C ≥ 0 and FL c = 0
• Let E A ≤ E C , IC A ≥ IC C and TC A ≤ TC C .
• Then, one can infer that brokers' risk apprehension represented by an increase of k enlarges the conflict of interest areas at the expense of the convergent interest area. It entails that more unstable is the investment horizon of the client or more uncertain is the advisor's professional situation and more the convergent interest area shrinks.
Additionally, the conflict of interest disappears between brokers with a professional time horizon shorter than t* brok and investors with a long term horizon, because he or she will prefer to recommend Class A shares.
-effect of market trend expectations So, optimistic market trend forecasts do not only imply an additional demand for mutual funds (Karceski (2002) ) but they also imply an enlargement of the convergent interest area. The corollary is that pessimistic market trend forecasts decrease the convergent interest area. Nevertheless, this potential increase of the conflict of interest area is "compensated" by the decrease of the demand that characterizes an expected bear market period.
-effect of a variation of fees and commissions

Effect of a FL A increase
Proposition 3 : If FL A increases the convergent interest area increases.
Proof 3: equation (5) An increase of the daily expense ratio E A and/or front-end loads FL A implies an increase of the convergent interest area. From the conflict of interest perspective, one can say that an increase of Class A share fees has a virtuous effect 9 , all other things being equal. On the contrary, an increase of fees related to Class C share entails a decrease of the convergent interest area.
Effect of brokers' commission increase
Any variation of commissions has no impact on the net average return of investors. Therefore, it is only considered their effect on t* brok . 
IC t t
. 8 It is reminded that E daily , i is the daily expense ratio that includes "other expenses" and 12b-1 fees. 9 It can also be demonstrated that E A has a larger impact than FL A on the convergent interest area.
According to equation (7) In doing so, considering proposition (6) and reminding that 12b-1 fees are included in the daily expense ratio E i , if an increase of brokers' commissions is funded by an increase of fees in the same proportion, the effect on the convergent interest area is cancelled.
-Evolution of the conflict of interest according to invested amounts
The delimitation of these conflict of interest areas has been done assuming that invested amounts are lower than $50,000. Nevertheless, depending on the importance of the amount invested, Class A shares offer discounted loads. It is then examined if investors with larger amounts will be more or less exposed to the conflict of interest. It is applied to front-end loads the sliding scale according to the invested amount and breakpoints as described in Table 1 .
Additionally, while it is observed the evolution of the convergent interest area for class A and C shares, it is included the Class B share. From $50,000, brokers are indifferent between class A and B share and from $100,000 they systematically are more rewarded when they sell a class B share rather than selling a class A share.
From this breakpoint, higher invested amount are and narrower is the convergent interest area.
Additionally, including Class B Share, the convergent interest disappears for lower invested amount $500,000 in our example).
This last diagram stresses that investors the most exposed to the conflict of interest exposure are those with the largest amounts. This conclusion takes into account a comparison between class A, B and C shares and explains the conflict of interest with the expected holding period and the invested amount. 
Conclusion
It has been demonstrated the existence of a conflict of interest between investors and their financial advisor. To be concerned by these potentially conflicting situations, we have determined characteristics of investors in terms of expected holding period for their mutual fund shares and invested amount.
Isolating investors with an invested amount lower than $50,000 , it has been stressed with numerical simulations the existence of a convergent interest area and areas of conflict of interest according to their expected holding period. For these amounts lower than $50,000 it has been focused on a comparison between Class A and C shares. Varying variables of the model, we show that characteristics of investors exposed to the conflict of interest change.
Any increase of market trend expectations or Front end loads or daily expense ratio of class A share implies an increase of the convergent interest area.
An increase of the discount rate of brokers or daily expense ratio of Class C share shrinks the convergent interest area.
Integrating invested amounts and comparisons with class B shares, it appears that the convergent interest area shrinks for amounts higher than $100,000 and disappears for amounts higher than $500,000. From this breakpoint, any kind of investor is exposed to a potential conflict of interest with his or her financial advisor. 5.75% 5% $50,000 -$100,000 4.50% 4% $100,000 -$250,000 3.50% 3.20% $250,000 -$500,000 2.50% 2.25%
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$500 000-$1,000,000 2% 12b-1 fees are an annual marketing or distribution fee on a mutual fund. They are paid every year as long as the investor holds his or her shares.
Deferred loads : also known as a back-end sales charge, they are imposed when an investor redeems shares. The percentage charged declines the longer shares are held.
Other expenses: annual fees non related to distribution expenses.
Front-end loads are sales charge applied at the time of the initial purchase for a mutual fund. It is deducted from the investment amount. 
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